Why the US–China trade war spells disaster for the Amazon by Fuchs, Richard et al.
OBITUARY Bill Jenkins, a 
Tuskegee whistle-blower 
who drove justice p.462
SIGNIFICANCE Don’t remove 
the statistical bar — raise 
it instead p.461
STATISTICS A friendly primer 
from a life of crunching data 
for decision makers p.458
SUSTAINABILITY Will technology 
solve the food crisis or just 
create new ones? p.456
Last year, the United States intro-duced tariffs of up to 25% on Chinese imported goods worth 
US$250 billion. In retaliation, the Chinese 
government imposed tariffs of 25% on 
$110-billion worth of US goods — includ-
ing soya beans, a crop mainly used for 
animal feed. As a result, exports of US soya 
beans to China dropped by 50% in 2018, 
even though the trade war began only mid-
way through the year. 
We forecast that a surge of tropical defor-
estation could occur as a result of the fresh 
demand being placed on China’s other 
major suppliers to provide up to 37.6 mil-
lion tonnes of the crop (that is how much 
China imported from the United States in 
2016). Already, two decades of growth in 
the global market for soya has led to large-
scale deforestation in the Amazon rainfor-
est1. 
As of 2016, Brazil supplied almost half of 
China’s soya-bean imports, and it has the 
infrastructure and land area to rapidly 
US–China trade war 
imperils Amazon rainforest
An analysis of global soya-bean production forecasts massive deforestation in Brazil 
— stakeholders must act fast to prevent it, warn Richard Fuchs and colleagues.
Fields of soya beans (left) sit alongside untouched natural forest in the Cerrado ecoregion of Brazil.






































increase production. We estimate that 
the area dedicated to soya-bean produc-
tion in Brazil could increase by up to 
39%, to 13 million hectares, extrapolat-
ing from the most recent (2016) data from 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO). For compari-
son, almost 3 million hectares of rainfor-
est were cleared in 1995 and in 2004, the 
country’s two peak deforestation years (see 
go.nature.com/2xtkkrd). 
We urge the United States and China 
to adjust their trading arrangements 
immediately to avoid this catastrophe. We 
also lay out some of the broader changes 
needed — globally and within nations — to 
shield tropical forests from shifting trade 
patterns.
BEAN COUNTING 
China depends heavily on soya-bean 
imports from three trading partners. Brazil 
is the largest, followed by the United States 
and Argentina2. Ninety-four other coun-
tries, including China itself, together pro-
duce little more soya than Brazil alone (see 
‘Soya swings’, panel B; and Supplementary 
Information).
To cope with the current shortfall in 
US exports, China could reduce its use of 
soya bean. This seems unlikely given the 
nation’s growing demand for meat. Just a 
2% reduction in soya as animal feed would 
result in the country producing 10 million 
tonnes less meat each year3. 
China could increase its own produc-
tion of soya beans. But it would have to 
triple it to make up the shortfall. That 
would require around 13 million hectares 
of land — an area the size of Greece. This 
also seems unlikely given the limited fertile 
land now available for crops. 
Some reconfiguration of trade flows 
might absorb some of the shortfall, as 
could efforts to substitute other crops 
into animal feed, such as rapeseed and 
maize (corn). Last year, Argentina and 
the European Union started buying soya 
from the United States for livestock feed 
and biofuel4. This could make soya beans 
produced by Argentina, or rapeseed pro-
duced by the European Union, available for 
export to China. 
But it is unclear whether China will 
engage in trade deals that would ultimately 
benefit the United States. Also, globally, 
soya is the preferred choice for animal 
feed: it contains both protein and fat, and 
the crop fixes nitrogen, reducing the need 
for fertilizer (see ‘Uses of Brazilian soya’). 
Lastly, the contributions made by small 
producers are tiny compared with what’s 
needed — even accounting for possible 
increases in production. Russia’s plan to 
boost its production by 20% over the next 
few years3, for instance, would result in 
future exports of only 0.7 million tonnes. 
In our view, the most likely scenario is 
that Brazil will ramp up its production sub-
stantially, and a few other major producers 
will supply whatever else is needed. 
Political, legal and trade-system inter-
ventions that have prevented the expansion 
of soya-bean production in the Amazon5 
are now being weakened1. For instance, 
Brazil’s newly elected president, Jair 
Bolsonaro, limited the land rights of Indig-
enous people this January (see go.nature.
com/2y9rjvn). Indeed, deforestation 
increased by 29% between 2015 and 2016 
(see go.nature.com/2xtkkrd), and jumped 
by 50% between August and October 2018, 
during the Brazilian presidential election 
campaign (see go.nature.com/2uyrjpt). 
Also, trade wars have resulted in hikes in 
soya-bean production in Brazil in the past. 
Following a 1980 
US embargo on 
soya-bean exports 
t o  t h e  S o v i e t 
Union, the amount 
of land devoted 
to its production 
in Brazi l  more 
than doubled between 1990 and 2010, to 
24.2 million hectares. This pushed cattle 
farming from the southern Cerrado savan-
nah into the Amazon, and caused nearly 
one-quarter of the total annual deforesta-
tion of the Amazon in some years1. 
SOYA SCENARIOS
To get a rough estimate of how global soya-
bean production might change under dif-
ferent trade scenarios, we analysed the 2016 
data from the FAO database FAOSTAT. This 
includes 94 nations’ total land area dedicated 
to soya, each country’s yield rates and their 
overall production for the year (see Sup-
plementary Information for methods). It 
also includes trade data — who exported to 
China, how much, and so on. 
Assuming there is no change in total 
global demand, an extra 22.6 million to 
37.6 million tonnes of soya-bean production 
in Brazil would satisfy China’s needs (see 
‘Soya swings’, panel A). 
If all 94 countries help to make up the 
shortfall, with their percentage contribu-
tions staying at current levels, Brazil would 
need to supply as much as 16.7 million extra 
tonnes of soya beans. This would require up 
to 5.7 million hectares more land (a 17.3% 
increase). Under this scenario, Argentina 
would then supply an additional 6.1 million 
to 10.2 million tonnes (requiring 2.0 mil-
lion to 3.3 million hectares of land at current 
yields), with all the other producers (exclud-
ing China) together producing around the 
same amount as Argentina. 
These figures do not account for the 
potential cultivation of soya beans on land 
that is now used for other protein and oil 
crops, such as maize, palm oil and rapeseed. 
But the substitution of one crop for another 
has technical and political limits. In Brazil, 
for example, soya beans, sugar cane and 
maize represent around 85% of total crop 
production, and all three are crucial to the 
nation’s economy. (Sugar cane is used to pro-
duce the biofuel ethanol, which gives Brazil 
independence from the global oil market, 
and maize is used as livestock fodder.) It is 
possible to import palm oil from Malaysia 
or Indonesia, say, but this would cause defor-
estation in those countries. 
The requirements for land could be 
reduced a little if producers were to increase 
their yields. The leading soya-bean pro-
ducers (Brazil, Argentina, Canada and 
Russia) currently achieve average yields 
of 1.5–3 tonnes of soya bean per hectare, 
compared with a US yield of 3.5 tonnes. The 
United States adds around 62 kilograms 
of fertilizer per hectare, Canada 60 kg and 
Brazil 169 kg on nutrient-poor tropical soils. 
Only Russia (26 kg of fertilizer per hectare) 
and Argentina (14 kg) could produce more 
crops per land area by using more fertilizer6. 
In fact, our figures might well be under-
estimates. They do not account for hikes 
in demand that are unrelated to the trade 
war. In the past two decades, China’s use 
of soya has risen exponentially; since 2000, 
the country’s imports have gone up by 200% 
from Argentina, by 700% from the United 
States and by 2,000% from Brazil (see ‘Soya 
swings’, panel B). It is highly likely that 
China’s enormous appetite for livestock feed 
and bio energy will continue to grow. 
A LOSING BATTLE
China will probably want to reduce its 
dependence on the United States, even if US 
President Donald Trump decides to abolish 
the tariffs on its imports. (These are currently 
being heavily negotiated.) For instance, the 
Soviet Union did not go back to buying US 
soya beans when the 1980 embargo was 
withdrawn only a year later, seeing them 
as unnecessary and unreliable7. Thus, even 
under the most optimistic scenarios, millions 
4 5 2  |  N A T U R E  |  V O L  5 6 7  |  2 8  M A R C H  2 0 1 9
COMMENT
“Trade wars 
have resulted in 
hikes in soya-
bean production 















USES OF BRAZILIAN SOYA



















































more hectares of the Amazon rainforest are 
now threatened. Indeed, the expansion of 
soya-bean production in areas other than the 
Amazon, such as in Brazil’s Cerrado tropical 
savannah, will lead to further loss of tropical 
forest, for example through the displacement 
of pasturelands8.
Leaving aside these potential major 
changes, current rates of tropical defor-
estation are projected to release between 
87 and 130 gigatonnes of carbon by 2100, 
and land conversion in general is expected 
to release more carbon in the tropics than 
in any other biome this century9,10. Like-
wise, species extinctions in tropical forests 
are already expected to increase until the 
2050s, with as many as 19 of every 20 spe-
cies lost being unknown to science11. 
Massive deforestation of the Amazon 
over what’s already happening will have 
profound impacts on global attempts to 
mitigate climate change and protect bio-
diversity. 
So how can such devastating environ-
mental outcomes from this or future trade 
wars be avoided? 
Remove soya from tariffs. First and fore-
most, China and the United States should 
publicly acknowledge their roles in indi-
rectly driving tropical deforestation, and 
take immediate action to at least remove 
trade tariffs on the crop. 
Diversify suppliers. China should also 
seek a wider range of suppliers. Even the 
European Union could be a candidate, 
although to compete with major produc-
ers such as the United States, it would have 
to reconsider its opposition to genetically 
modified soya-bean strains that are tolerant 
to pesticides such as glyphosate. 
Improve  Br azi l’s  env ironmental 
protection schemes. The international 
community must do more to encour-
age the Brazilian government to enhance 
environmental protections. Initiatives 
such as REDD+, which aims to reward 
developers and others financially for not 
clearing forests, provide mechanisms for 
coordinated action. 
Regulatory interventions designed to 
control the drivers of environmental deg-
radation — or to limit its extent — are also 
needed. Such interventions are inevitably 
controversial and contingent on volatile 
political circumstances, but precedents 
exist. For example, the European Com-
mission’s 1991 Nitrates Directive has led 
to a 22% decline in the use of fertilizer 
across Europe since 1990 (ref. 2). It forms 
part of another instrument, the Water 
Framework Directive, which has reduced 
nitrogen concentrations in rivers by 21%, 
ammonium by 75% and phosphorus by 
59% since 1992. 
Most pertinently, Brazil’s Soy Morato-
rium, in which major traders agreed not to 
buy soya grown on lands deforested after 
July 2006, has helped to reduce the conver-
sion of forest to cropland12. This was a partial 
success owing to the various monitoring sys-
tems that were deployed to enforce it, such 
as police helicopters to track illegal logging. 
That achievement is now threatened, given 
the rise in rogue logging, indirect land-use 
changes and political machinations under 
Bolsonaro’s presidency.
Grow locally. Ultimately, growing crops 
in the countries where they will actually be 
consumed would give nations better con-
trol of production levels and environmental 
impacts, as well as more economic security. 
As part of the mix of solutions, it would 
help if both China and the European 
Union intensified their efforts to produce 
protein crops. This would mean invest-
ing more in research and development, as 
well as in training farmers. Since the early 
2000s, China has decreased the amount 
of land it dedicates to soya-bean produc-
tion by around 25%, in part because it is 
cheaper to import from Brazil. The coun-
try’s five-year average yields are now half 
of those in Brazil or the United States2 (see 
‘Soya swings’). 
Change consumer behaviour. Over the 
next few decades, the long-term solution 
has to involve the global reduction of meat 
consumption. 
SOYA SWINGS
SCENARIO 1: Brazil alone covers US shortfall
SCENARIO 2: All producers cover US shortfall
A) SHIFTING PRODUCERS
Millions of hectares of land
Trade wars have caused massive deforestation in the Amazon in the past. The same is likely to happen 
now, if China continues to import more soya beans from Brazil (A) instead of from the United States (B). 








Domestic and non-China exportExport to ChinaAdditional area demand
B) SOYA IN CHINA
Demand for soya has increased exponentially over the past two decades in China; domestic 
production has decreased by 17%.
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One thing that might help is the grow-
ing awareness among consumers globally 
that eating less meat, or buying meat that is 
sustainably produced, benefits the environ-
ment. So far, such awareness has had little 
impact on production or consumption. 
A major supermarket chain in Germany 
reported in June 2018 that, despite consumer 
surveys indicating demand for sustainable 
meat products, its customers continued to 
select the less-sustainable options because 
they are cheaper. 
Educational measures to change con-
sumer behaviours, such as the use of food 
labelling or ‘eco-certification’, or informa-
tion campaigns involving schools, are rela-
tively easy to introduce. But making such 
measures a legal requirement, and actually 
changing behaviour, would take too long 
to lift the current pressures on tropical 
forests13. 
Subsidies and taxes that favour sustain-
able forms of production tend to be effec-
tive. But these can require considerable 
up-front investment from governments. 
Even then, such market-based policies are 
often insufficient to avert severe environ-
mental degradation14. 
In our view, what could be most effective 
are mechanisms that include the environ-
mental costs of agricultural production 
in the price of the product. Making these 
costs unavoidable (rather than relying on 
consumer choice) could be a robust way 
of stemming the loss of crucial natural 
systems. Obviously, proper valuation of 
environmental costs would have to occur 
alongside vigorous efforts to reduce those, 
to ensure that such a strategy does not 
threaten food security. 
WARNING SIGNS
Early signs in the current US–China trade 
war are not encouraging. Brazil has already 
begun to strengthen its negotiating posi-
tion by boosting 
its production. As 
of late 2018, 75% of 
China’s soya-bean 
imports came from 
Brazil — a new 
record — meaning 
the entire US short-
fall was substituted 
with Brazilian soya beans (see go.nature.
com/2hizafd). 
And traders have made their bets. The 
MSCI Brazil index, which lists the country’s 
52 largest companies, has risen by roughly 
35% since October 2018 (when Bolsonaro 
was elected and Trump introduced the latest 
tariffs on Chinese imports). This represents 
the largest increase of all regional markets at 
present (see go.nature.com/2cstcwy). 
Governments, producers, regulators and 
consumers must act now. If they don’t, the 
Amazon rainforest could become the great-
est casualty of the US–China trade war. ■
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In the Comment ‘Four steps to global 
management of space traffic’ (Nature 
567, 25–27; 2019), the graphic 
‘Traffic jam’ originally implied that all 
12,000 SpaceX satellites will orbit at 
1,325 km; in fact, around 7,500 of them 
will fly at very low Earth orbit (340 km).
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